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The Regional Stabilisation Strategy is illustrative of a development model that
can build local resilience to counter transnational terror threats. It seeks to
incorporate non-military actors in efforts to consolidate the gains of security
forces as well as sustainably address the root causes of con ict in the Lake
Chad region.
Since 2009, Boko Haram and its splinter group, the Islamic State West Africa
Province (ISWAP), have remained largely responsible for militant jihadist group
activity in the four countries bordering the Lake Chad: Chad, Cameroon, Niger and
Nigeria. The violence from the two groups has deepened instability, sti ed economic
growth and engendered humanitarian concerns. In efforts to stabilise the Lake Chad
Basin region, academic and policy practitioners have mainly focused on the
terrorism component of the crises, with funding generally geared towards increasing
regional cooperation for counterterrorism offensives through the Multinational Joint
Task Force (MNJTF).
Although coordinated military operations with national governments and the MNJTF
have been relatively successful in retrieving territory formerly held by Boko Haram
and ISWAP, these military strategies have remained incomplete in effectively
addressing the many complex root causes that have resulted in increased activities
from violent extremist organisations operating in the Lake Chad area.
What is the Regional Stabilisation Strategy?
The establishment of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy (RSS) in 2018 is a welcome
development in countering the transnational terrorist threats from Boko Haram and
its a liates. The  ve-year strategy – a product of broad consultations among
regional experts, relevant agencies of the United Nations and other stakeholders
such as civil society representatives and bilateral partners – aims to address the
structural challenges of vulnerability and insecurity for sustainable peace and
development in the Lake Chad region. The Strategy also demonstrates the
commitment of the Lake Chad Basin Commission in developing non-military regional
responses that can complement the efforts of the MNJTF and member states in
stabilising Boko Haram-affected areas. By recognising the important nexus between
governance, security and humanitarian intervention and development, the Strategy
calls for a ‘New Way of Working’ to be at the heart of the response to the Lake Chad
Basin crises.
Promoted programmes and initiatives under the RSS are anchored in the
commonalities of affected states while acknowledging the peculiarities of each of
the concerned Lake Chad Basin member countries. For example, the Governor
Forum – comprising the governors of the regions in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and
Nigeria most affected by the violence caused by Boko Haram and related challenges
– promotes continuous dialogue and the sharing of information, best practices and
lessons learned from the implementation of the RSS. As such, the Governor Forum
has been essential in identifying regional and cross-border priorities that have
included strengthening cross-border trade, regional economic development and
employment opportunities, especially for youth, as part of efforts to reduce
recruitment for violent extremist organisations. The Forum has also highlighted the
need to rehabilitate and reintegrate victims of the Boko Haram insurgency and ex-
combatants, along with increasing the engagement of civil society, including
traditional and religious leaders in managing local con icts.
Moreover, to ensure an integrated, targeted and sequenced move from humanitarian
assistance to sustainable development in Boko Haram-affected areas, a civil-military
co-operation cell reinforces the capacity of the MNJTF by building trust between
communities, governments and security providers. For instance, in reinforcing the
capacity of the multinational force, the civil-military co-operation cell of the joint task
force supports MNJTF troops by facilitating training and workshops for newly
deployed military personnel on human rights and humanitarian law. These training
programmes have improved the attitude and skills of MNJTF troops, particularly
their ability to engage in strategies related to civilian protection to win the hearts and
minds of local communities.
Challenges for implementing the Strategy
Implementation of the Strategy has remained slow, however, suffering from funding
gaps and challenges. Despite its establishment, affected countries have continued
to rely on military institutions to address governance issues in the region, with the
MNJTF and national security troops remaining the face of regional and national
strategies to counter violent extremism in the Lake Chad region. Although MNJTF
troops and national armies have engaged Boko Haram and ISWAP with superior
training and equipment from the US, France speci cally and the EU, operations have
rarely been sustained with longer-term development projects and initiatives, resulting
in insurgents being able to quickly regroup after MNJTF operations.
This has been further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the RSS
outlined prioritisation for 2019/20, for example, the Lake Chad Basin Commission
and MNJTF civilian staff were unable to carry out most of the proposed critical
infrastructure development projects in target communities. This limited engagement
with local communities as a result of travel restrictions and border closures from the
COVID-19 pandemic contributed to member states’ further reliance on military
institutions to counter Boko Haram as well as the growing distrust between local
populations and state security forces in some communities in the region.
Nevertheless, the recent establishment of the RSS is illustrative of a development
model of stabilisation that can complement military efforts as well as address the
root causes of the Lake Chad crises, combining hard-security interventions and soft-
security measures. It is also more ambitious when compared to short-term military
approaches with respect to building state legitimacy in order to undercut support for
violent organisations.
Most important, the Strategy represents a sustainable framework from which
scholars and practitioners can learn. Thus, despite its current challenges, there is
room for member states and international partners to note aspects of the Strategy
that have been most effective and aspects that need improvement. This will be
essential in promoting community-driven solutions that can boost the resilience of
member states as well as address the region’s complex crises while ensuring the
human security of local populations.
This article is excerpted from the Author’s SWAC/OECD West African Papers series,
‘Non-Military Actors as a Regional Strategy in the Lake Chad Region’. The longer
version can be found here.
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